Countering Unrealistic Expectations: Limiting Auditors\u27 Liability to Investors by Prillaman, Anne T.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 32 Number 4 Article 9 
1994 
Countering Unrealistic Expectations: Limiting Auditors' Liability to 
Investors 
Anne T. Prillaman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anne T. Prillaman, Countering Unrealistic Expectations: Limiting Auditors' Liability to Investors, 32 Duq. L. 
Rev. 849 (1994). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol32/iss4/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Countering Unrealistic Expectations: Limiting
Auditors' Liability to Investors
"They're Bean Counters, Not Gumshoes";1 so reads a recent
headline protesting the increased liability of accountants for pro-
fessional negligence in failing to detect fraud and embezzlement by
employees of their corporate clients.2 Literature in the accounting
and legal fields is replete with statistics showing that both the
number of lawsuits and the settlement or damage awards against
accounting firms have increased substantially in the last decade.3
Professional associations in the accounting field have attempted to
redefine standards and proposed various solutions to reverse this
trend but, as yet, there is no viable solution even remotely within
sight.
In the area of liability to third parties relying on accountants'
opinions concerning the financial health of their client companies,
the largest problem appears to be that, supposedly in the interests
of public policy, the courts are unable to agree on the appropriate
scope of auditors'4 liability. Opinions range from the Alabama
viewpoint, which holds that there is no duty of care owed to third
parties and no liability for fraud unless there is an intent to influ-
ence, 5 to the Wisconsin theory, which holds that auditors owe a
duty of care to all persons who could reasonably be recipients of
1. Dean Foust, They're Bean Counters, Not Gumshoes, Bus. WK., Sept. 14, 1992, at
92.
2. The reference to accountants as "bean counters" probably can be traced to one of
the seminal cases in this area that involved the question of potential liability of public
weighers employed by a seller of beans. The weighers were found liable, despite the absence
of privity, to the buyer who relied on the weight certificate in paying for the beans. Glanzer
v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
3. In 1991, the accounting profession spent $477 million to settle or defend itself
against lawsuits, a figure which, at the time, represented approximately 10% of the Big Six's
income. Claims against small and medium-sized firms doubled between 1987 and 1991. Au-
lana L. Peters, Survey of Development of Accountants' Liability Law From the Demise of
Privity to the Cry For Tort Reform, C859 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 877, 899-900 (1993) (citing a speech
by Philip Chenok, the President of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA")).
4. Although technically distinguishable, the terms accountant and auditor are used
synonymously in this comment.
5. DENZIL Y. CAUSEY, JR. AND SANDRA A. CAUSEY, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS 168 (4th ed. 1991).
Duquesne Law Review
the accountants' reports." In addition, the courts, and even the ac-
counting profession itself, are unable to agree on the appropriate
standards to define the professional duty owed to both clients and
third parties and the level of professional negligence which triggers
liability.
Apparently heeding the pleas for reform issued by the account-
ing profession, the California Supreme Court recently reversed its
earlier trend toward expansion of the duty owed to third persons
and has sharply restricted the parties who may recover damages
from an allegedly negligent accountant. This comment reviews
that decision and the reasoning of the opinion and suggests that
the court still has not addressed the basic problem. Until specific
standards for specific circumstances are delineated and adopted,
different courts will readily apply the widely disparate theories of
liability in order to achieve what they believe is a fair result. Con-
sensus in the definition of exactly what constitutes appropriate
professional standards is necessary before the split in the courts
can be resolved. This comment focuses on cases involving alleged
ordinary negligence under the common law; areas outside the scope
of this analysis are those cases involving gross negligence or fraud
by the accountant and cases under the federal securities laws.8
I. BACKGROUND
A. Defining the Standard of Care
When performing audits, accountants are expected to use the
usual judgment, care, skill and diligence employed by similar pro-
fessionals in similar communities." In an audit engagement, the ac-
6. CAUSEY, cited at note 5, at 168.
7. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
8. The general view is that gross negligence is not the equivalent of fraud, but may
give rise to an inference of fraud. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Indepen-
dent Accountant to Investors or Shareholders, 35 A.L.R. 4TH 225, § 4 (1985). In Ultramares
v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), the court indicated that an accountant who is grossly
negligent in the preparation of an audit opinion could be found to be without information
leading to a sincere belief in the accuracy of the financial statements thus inferring that the
accountant's opinion was fraudulently given. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 448.
9. CAUSEY, cited at note 5, at 18; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
The courts quote Thomas Cooley in describing the standard:
In all those employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services, he
is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill
commonly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his pretensions are
unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon every man who employs him in reli-
ance on his public profession. But no man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes
that the task he assumes shall be performed successfully, and without fault or error;
850 Vol. 32:849
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countant reviews financial statements 0 prepared by the client
company in order to express an opinion as to whether the state-
ments present an accurate representation of the company's finan-
cial condition.'
The typical audit is divided into several stages.12 First, the audi-
tor plans the scope of the audit; this process involves collecting
information about the company's business and accounting sys-
tems. 3 This information is used in the second stage to evaluate the
client's internal controls.' 4 The third stage involves testing by the
auditor to determine whether proper procedures are followed by
the client company in executing and recording transactions." In
the fourth stage, the audit system is tested by examining relevant
documentation and verifying balances.' The end result of an audi-
tor's analysis is the written opinion, which is issued to accompany
the client-prepared financial statements. 7
In the testing stages, an auditor rarely reviews every transaction
since this would be prohibitively expensive. 8 Based on the evalua-
tion of the client's internal controls, the auditor must use profes-
sional skill and judgment to determine the extent of the testing
required before an informed opinion can be issued.' 9 The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") issues rules
and procedures for preparation of financial statements called Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Procedures ("GAAP") and rules and
procedures for auditors called Generally Accepted Auditing Stan-
he undertakes for good faith and integrity but not for infallibility, and he is liable to
his employer for negligence, bad faith, or dishonesty but not for losses consequent
upon mere errors of judgment.
CAUSEY, cited at note 5, at 18 (quoting THOMAS COOLEY, TORTS § 335 (4th ed. 1932)).
10. Financial statements are summaries of the financial condition or financial results
of an organization. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 631 (6th ed. 1990). The client company is re-
sponsible for the recording of financial transactions and preparation of the financial state-
ments which are issued as representations by its management. R. JAMES GORMLEY, THE LAW
OF ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS-RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES 1.01 (1981).
11. Willis W. Hagen II, Certified Public Accountants' Liability for Malpractice: Ef-
fect of Compliance with GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 65, 68-69 (1987) (citations
omitted).
12. Hagen, cited at note 11, at 67 (citations omitted).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 68 (citations omitted). "Internal controls" are the administrative and ac-
counting controls used by a company to ensure appropriate procedures are followed for au-
thorizing and recording business transactions. Id. at 67 n.21.
15. Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
16. Id.
17. Hagen, cited at note 11, at 68-69.
18. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 749 (Cal. 1992).
19. Bily, 834 P.2d at 749-50 (citing Hagen, cited at note 11, at 67-68).
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dards ("GAAS").20 The auditor's opinion certifies that the client
company's financial statements were prepared in accordance with
GAAP and that the audit was conducted in compliance with
GAAS; thus in the auditor's reasonable judgment, the financial
statements fairly represent the client company's financial posi-
tion.2" However, auditors do not expressly guarantee either accu-
rate financials or discovery of defalcations.22
Litigation in this area normally involves claims by investors that
the financial statements do not accurately depict the client com-
pany's financial position and that there were deficiencies in the au-
dit process which failed to detect the misrepresentations. While
some courts have held that compliance with AICPA standards is
sufficient proof of due care,23 many courts state that compliance
with GAAS and GAAP does not ensure freedom from liability.
24
20. Id. at 750 (citations omitted). GAAP are promulgated by the Financial Account-
ing Standards Board ("FASB"), an independent group established by the Financial Ac-
counting Foundation. CAUSEY, cited at note 5, at 11. GAAS are promulgated by the Auditing
Standards Board, a group established by the AICPA. Id.
21. GORMLEY, cited at note 10, at 1.02. There are several "grades" of opinions that
auditors can issue; the first and most common is an unqualified or "clean" opinion. In this
case, the auditor certifies that the financial statements have been examined in accordance
with GAAS, including tests and other procedures that the auditor considered necessary in
the circumstances. Following this representation, the auditor issues the actual opinion which
normally states that in the auditor's reasonable judgment, the financial statements present
fairly the client's financial position and results of operations in conformance with GAAP. Id.
The auditor can also issue a qualified opinion, which is normally the result of some sub-
stantial uncertainty such as pending litigation which makes it impossible for the auditor to
determine whether the financial statements are a fair presentation of the client company's
financial health. In addition, auditors can issue a disclaimer of opinion which is the result of
an inability to make a judgment due to financial problems of the client company or limita-
tion of the scope of the engagement. Finally, an auditor can issue an adverse opinion, either
wholly or partially, which is a result of the auditor's conclusion that the financial statements
deviate materially from GAAP or are somehow unfair. Id.
22. CAUSEY, cited at note 5, at 19. The courts in California seem to be cognizant of
this limitation; while rejecting a claim for malpractice, one court stated that "'[t]hose who
hire such persons are not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable
care and competence. They purchase service, not insurance.'" Linder v. Barlow, Davis &
Wood, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15,
21 (Cal. 1954)).
A defalcation is defined as an act of embezzling or misappropriation of trust funds or
money held in any fiduciary capacity; commonly spoken of officers of corporations or public
officials. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990).
23. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785,
788 (9th Cir. 1979); see generally, Hagen, cited at note 11, at 77-78 (discussing legal effects
of compliance with GAAP and GAAS).
24. In Maduff Mortgage Corp. v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 779 P.2d 1083 (Ore. Ct.
App. 1989), when Deloitte argued on appeal that a jury instruction which stated that an
auditor is not liable for failing to detect fraud unless it has failed to comply with GAAS
should have been given, the court rejected the argument stating:
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B. Defining the Scope of the Duty of Care
Generally, in determining the scope of the duty of care owed by
the accountant to injured parties, courts have adopted one of three
theories. The first, a strict privity formulation, restricts the duty of
care to the extent of the contract with the client. A second theory
holds that the duty is extended to specific non-contracting parties,
or entire categories of such parties, whose reliance on the account-
ant's report was actually foreseen by the accountant. The third
theory, which is the broadest option, defines the scope as encom-
passing all those persons whose reliance was merely foreseeable,
rather than specifically foreseen.
1. Privity
Courts applying the privity theory of liability hold that an ac-
countant is not liable for negligence to a third party for errors in
the preparation of financial statements for a client because the ac-
countant is not in privity of contract with the third party.2 5 The
privity concept required for finding accountant liability originated
in the often cited opinion of Justice Cardozo in Ultramares v.
Touche.26 In that case, a public accounting firm was held not liable
for negligence to a third party lending company which had relied
on a certified balance sheet prepared by the accounting firm for its
client.17 Justice Cardozo's opinion stated that it would be unfair to
impose such broad liability when the accountant had no knowledge
that the creditor would rely on the report in determining whether
to advance credit to the client company." The court distinguished
[T]he AICPA standards are only evidentiary.. . . They are principles and procedures
developed by the accounting profession itself, not by the courts or the legislature.
They may be useful to a jury in determining the standard of care for an auditor, but
they are not controlling. The amount of care, skill and diligence required to be used
by defendant in conducting an audit is a question of fact for the jury, just as it is in
other fields for other professionals.
Maduff Mortgage Corp., 779 P.2d at 1086.
25. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
26. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 442. A Pennsylvania case, Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A.
783 (Pa. 1919), decided before Ultramares, held that privity of contract is required for an
accountant to be liable to an investor for negligence. Landell, 107 A. at 783. It is, however,
the Ultramares case that is credited for establishing this theory.
27. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 442.
28. Id. at 444. The portion of the opinion frequently quoted states:
[I]f liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a
theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkin-
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prior cases that had imposed liability to third parties, on the basis
that in those instances, the reports had been prepared primarily
for the benefit of the third party as opposed to primarily for the
benefit of the client.29 The justification for this view is that liabil-
ity to "an indeterminate class in an indeterminate amount" is con-
trary to public policy.30 The reasoning stressed that the accountant
owed no duty to a "stranger," even when the accountant knew that
the reports would be relied upon by others besides the client; the
duty should be only to the client for whose "primary benefit" the
report was made. s"
2. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
The second theory of liability, which is based on section 552 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, takes the position that, under
certain circumstances, public accountants may be held liable to a
third party, with whom they are not in privity, for their negligence
in the preparation of a financial statement or other report.3 2 The
die doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes
accountants to these consequences.
Id.
29. Id. at 446.
30. Id. at 444.
31. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 446-47. In a subsequent opinion, the New York Court of
Appeals adopted a modified version of the privity requirement. Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). In Credit Alliance, the court held that
an accountant may owe a duty to third parties if the relationship between them "sufficiently
approach[es] privity." Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 119. In order to establish this relation-
ship, three requirements must be met: (1) the accountant must be aware that the financial
statements are to be used for a particular purpose; (2) the accountant must intend for the
third party to rely on the statement; and (3) there must be some conduct linking the ac-
countant to the third party which demonstrates the accountant's understanding of the third
party's reliance. Id. at 118. The court specifically stated that although these requirements
allow some flexibility in the application of the privity doctrine, the principles articulated in
Ultramares are still applicable. Id.
32. See Rusch Factors Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91-93 (D.R.I. 1968). The text of
the Restatement (Second) is as follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the informa-
tion. (2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered (a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it
in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipi-
ent so intends or in a substantially similar transaction. (3) The liability of one who is
under a public duty to give the information extends to loss suffered by any.of the
Comments
appropriate circumstances would be where the information was
supplied for the guidance of the third party, or a class of which the
third party is a member, and was justifiably relied upon in a type
of transaction in which the accountant's representations were in-
tended to have an effect.33 The reasoning behind this rule is that
the accountant's knowledge of intended reliance imposes a duty of
care. 3 This rule restricts the scope of liability to only those third
parties whose reliance was actually foreseen by the accountant due
to the magnitude of pecuniary harm which can result when misin-
formation is widely disseminated. 35 This approach is justified on
the basis that pecuniary harm is substantially different from prop-
erty or physical injury that is the result of other types of negli-
gence.36 The Restatement (Second) approach is followed by more
jurisdictions than either the privity or the broad foreseeability the-
ories, probably because it represents a satisfactory compromise be-
tween strict privity and unlimited liability.
3 7
3. Broad Foreseeability
The broadest view of the scope of duty owed by accountants to
third parties, which was first adopted by the supreme courts of
New Jersey and Wisconsin, extends liability to the potentially very
large class of all foreseeable third persons who might use reports
prepared by the accountant.3 8 In Rosenblum v. Adler, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey decided that public policy should be consid-
ered in determining the extent of accountants' liability to third
parties; so, imposing a duty depends upon a balancing of the inter-
ests of the injured third party, the accountant and the public. 9
The court reasoned that extending the scope of liability to all po-
tentially foreseeable third parties would encourage the accounting
firms to engage in more thorough reviews and would also serve to
compensate the innocent third parties while shifting the risk of a
class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in
which it is intended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, cmt. (a); cmt. (h), illus. 10; cmt. (j)
(1976).
34. Id. at cmt. (h).
35. Id. at cmt. (a).
36. Id.
37. Bily, 834 P.2d at 758-59 (citations omitted).
38. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Citizens State Bank v.
Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
39. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 147.
1994
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negligent audit to the party responsible for the loss.40
Applying a different analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted a position similar to that of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Rosenblum.41 Rejecting the Restatement (Second) posi-
tion because it does not extend liability to all foreseeable users of
financial statements, the Wisconsin court decided that negligence
law determines the extent of accountants' liability to third par-
ties.42 Thus, liability would be imposed for the foreseeable injuries
resulting from negligent acts."3 The court qualified the decision by
stating that liability would be limited by public policy considera-
tions normally applied in negligence cases.44
C. The Bily Decision
Although the California courts once led the way in breaching the
privity barrier,45 the recent decision in Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co." indicates that courts are reconsidering the presumed benefits
of enlarging the scope of accountant's liability.4 7 In Bily, the ac-
countant defendant had been retained by a manufacturer of porta-
ble personal computers to audit its financial statements. 8 The
plaintiffs were investors in the company and included both indi-
vidual and institutional investors who had purchased stock or war-
rants from the company."' The accountant issued "clean" audit
opinions and when the company subsequently declared bank-
ruptcy, the investors sued the accountant alleging, among other
40. Id. at 152.
41. See Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
42. Id. at 366.
43. Id.
44. Id. The court listed a number of such policy reasons set out in previous negli-
gence cases:
(1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of
proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in retrospect it ap-
pears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the
harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on
the negligent tortfeasor; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to
open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a field
that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Id. (citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958); International Mortgage
Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (Cal. App. 1986), overruled
by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
46. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
47. Peters, cited at note 3, at 891-92.




claims, professional negligence in preparation of the audit re-
ports.50 Overruling a prior decision, the California Supreme Court
held that auditors are liable for general negligence in the conduct
of an audit only to their client.5 1 However, the court did create a
limited exception to this rule, holding that auditors may be liable
for negligent misrepresentations to a narrow class of persons who
are "specifically intended beneficiaries of the audit report who are
known to the auditor and for whose benefit it renders the audit
report. ' 52 The decision left intact the common law rule that any
party who foreseeably relies on an intentionally fraudulent repre-
sentation can recover.
5 3
The primary concern expressed by the court was that allowing
all foreseeable third parties to recover would subject auditors to
liability out of proportion to their fault.54 By differentiating profes-
sional negligence from negligent misrepresentation, the court
sought to focus the inquiry away from the auditor's conduct and
on to the third party's claim of reasonable reliance.5 5 The court
discussed the difficulties inherent in the audit process, emphasiz-
ing the restrictions faced by accountants and the wide range of
permissible judgments that an auditor, performing under the ap-
plicable standard of care, can exercise appropriately.56
Throughout the opinion, the court frequently noted that claims
of reasonable reliance on the audit reports in transactions involv-
ing sophisticated financial institutions are suspect.5 7 The court
particularly stressed that investment decisions are complex and
multifaceted and that "professions of reliance on audit reports
may be easily fabricated"; thus a claim of reliance should be rigor-
ously questioned.
5 8
50. Id. at 747-49.
51. Id. at 767.
52. Id.
53. Bily, 834 P.2d at 747.
54. Id. at 761.
55. Id. at 772.
56. Peters, cited at note 3, at 894; Bily, 834 P.2d at 762-63.
57. See, e.g., Bily, 834 P.2d at 763-65.
58. Bily, 834 P.2d at 763-64 n.12. The court explained why claims of reliance should
be suspect, stating:
Although an audit report might play a role in such decisions, reasonable and prudent
investors and lenders will dig far deeper in their "due diligence" investigations than
the surface level of an auditor's opinion. And, particularly in financially large transac-
tions, the ultimate decision to lend or invest is often based on numerous business




The Bily court thus established a very restricted view of an ac-
countant's duty by limiting it to third parties who actually and
reasonably relied on the financial statements and "whom the audi-
tor intended to induce into action or influence in a specific transac-
tion."59 One commentator has noted that the language of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Bily suggests that the court wanted to
significantly restrict an accountant's liability in general, not just to
third parties.6 0
II. ANALYSIS
A. Limiting Liability-Costs vs. Benefits
In attempting to decide the issue of the appropriate scope of an
auditor's liability to third party investors, the courts have articu-
lated a number of reasons for either limiting or expanding the duty
owed. Those courts that favor expansion of liability generally have
based their decisions on the traditional tort concepts of compensa-
tion for the injured party and deterrence of negligent conduct."
These courts believe it is inherently unfair for an "innocent" inves-
tor, who relies on a financial statement, to suffer damage.2 How-
ever, as the Bily court pointed out, both individual and sophisti-
cated institutional investors' presumed reliance on the auditor's
certified financial statements is questionable.6 Several courts and
commentators have suggested that the basis for the "not so inno-
cent" investors' alleged reliance is actually the fact that in many
59. Peters, cited at note 3, at 894.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 365; Rusch Factors, 284 F. Supp. at
91. Proponents of expansion of accountants' liability to third parties note that the account-
ant has a different role than other professionals such as doctors or attorneys; that the ac-
countant has a "public watchdog" function that transcends any employment relationship
with the client. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984). "The inde-
pendent public accountant performing this special function [of certifying the public reports
that collectively depict a corporation's financial status] owes ultimate allegiance to the cor-
poration's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public." Arthur Young &
Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18. Note that this case involved an attempt to create an accountant's
workpapers privilege to prevent disclosure to the IRS under § 7602 of the IRC.
62. See, e.g., Rosenblum, 461.A.2d at 152; Rusch Factors, 284 F. Supp. at 91.
63. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765. The reasoning of the court was as follows:
If a third party possesses sufficient financial sophistication to understand and appre-
ciate the contents of audit reports ..., he or she should also be aware of their limita-
tions and of the alternative ways of privately ordering the relevant risks. If, on the
other hand, a third party lacks the threshold knowledge to understand the audit re-
port and its terms, he or she has no reasonable basis for reliance.
Id. at 765 n.13.
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cases, the auditor is the only potential defendant from whom a re-
covery can be obtained. 4
Courts and commentators express fear that expansion of liability
to all foreseeable third parties will not deter negligent audits, but
instead, will result in a decline in the number of accounting firms
willing to perform audit services." This, in turn, will ultimately
restrict the flow of financial information available to the investing
public.66 In many instances, accounting firms refuse to perform au-
dit and review engagements and are being much more selective in-
choosing their clients.6 7 Companies involved in high-risk indus-
tries, e.g., real estate investment, insurance and finance, and
fledgling companies will encounter difficulty finding a firm to per-
form auditing for a reasonable fee. 8 The reduction in firms willing
to perform audits and the corresponding reduction in the number
of public companies able to obtain these services are not in the
best interests of the investing public.
Another justification given by the courts favoring expansion of
auditors' liability is that the accountants are in a better position
than the client company or third parties to buy adequate insurance
and to pass the insurance and litigation costs on to their clients,
thus allocating the risk of negligently audited financial state-
ments.6 9 These courts compare the injured investor with the in-
jured consumer in products liability cases and conclude that ac-
64. See e.g., Eric R. Fencl, Note, Rebuilding the Citadel: State Legislative Responses
to Accountant Non-Privity Suits, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 863, 874 (1989). The Bily court noted
that it is inherently unfair to hold the auditor liable to investors because the accountant has
no expertise in or control over the client's business, but when the business fails, the ac-
countant is a prime target in litigation since it is the only available solvent entity. Bily, 834
P.2d at 763 (citing John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental
Tort Reform, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 1929, 1932-33 (1988)).
65. See, e.g., Bily, 834 P.2d at 766; Siliciano, cited at note 64, at 1959-60 (citations
omitted). In a case brought under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Supreme Court expressed concern that a broadening of the concept of the independent au-
ditor's liability to third parties will ultimately result in more harm than good. Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976) (citations omitted).
66. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 552, cmt. (a) (1976); Bily, 834 P.2d at
766 (citing Siliciano, cited at note 64, at 1960-65).
67. Bily, 834 P.2d at 766 (citing Siliciano, cited at note 64, at 1960).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 151; Rusch Factors, 284 F. Supp. at 91. The
assumption that accountants can easily obtain affordable insurance is questionable. As com-
petition and insurance costs increase, many accounting firms are finding that it is increas-
ingly difficult to obtain adequate insurance at a reasonable price. See Lee Berton, Account-
ing Profession, Once a Staid Field, Is Torn by Incivility, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1991 at Al;
Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants, Is Third Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 295, 295-96 (1988).
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countants' liability should be expanded in accordance with the
principle of strict products liability to protect the investor from
negligent audits. 70 However, as the Bily court pointed out, this
analogy is faulty for two reasons: (1) the manufacturer of a defi-
cient product has complete control over its production, whereas
the auditor merely expresses an opinion about financial statements
prepared by the client company, and (2) the sophisticated investor
is considerably different in character from the ordinary con-
sumer.71 Those in favor of limiting liability have noted that the
risk can be better allocated through private ordering. 72 An investor
who plans to rely on an audit report can contract directly with the
client company to obtain a special security arrangement, can be-
come an intended beneficiary of the audit or can hire an auditor to
conduct a separate audit of the client company on the investor's
behalf.73 Investors, particularly sophisticated institutional inves-
tors, can be considered to have "assumed the risk" of potentially
negligent management of the client company, negligent audits by
the accountant and the potential provision of imperfect
information.
B. Potential Solutions
The accounting profession, the courts and legal commentators
have proposed a number of solutions to prevent the negative con-
sequences of expansion of auditors' liability to third parties. Pro-
posed solutions include: (1) limited liability incorporation for ac-
counting firms; (2) full reliance on contract principles as opposed
to tort in determining liability; (3) statutory caps on tort liability;
and (4) structural reform of the accounting profession. 74 Another
solution proposed by several commentators advocates limitation of
auditors' liability through apportionment of damages in relation to
fault." These commentators suggest that application of the princi-
70. Bily, 834 P.2d at 764 (citing Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 145-47).
71. Bily, 834 P.2d at 764-65.
72. Id. at 765 (citing Siliciano, cited at note 64, at 1956-57). Private ordering employs
contract principles rather than tort law to allocate the risk between parties. Bily, 834 P.2d
at 761.
73. Id. at 765 (citing Siliciano, cited at note 64, at 1956-57).
74. Jordan H. Leibman and Anne S. Kelly, Accountants' Liability to Third Parties
for Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30 AM. Bus.
L.J. 345, 425-37 (1992).
75. Leibman, cited at note 74, at 375-425; See generally, Eric R. Dinallo, Note, The
Peculiar Treatment of Contributory Negligence in Accountants' Liability Cases, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 329 (1990); Dennis V. Dahle, Note, Comparative Negligence in Suits Against Ac-
Vol. 32:849
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ples of contributory and comparative negligence in lawsuits against
accountants will allow just and reasonable compensation for the
injured party without unfairly damaging the accountant.76 How-
ever, this proposal is subject to problems in application; there cur-
rently is a split in the courts concerning the issue of "whether and
to what extent" contributory negligence can be used as a defense
in accountant liability lawsuits." And, even when the courts allow
apportionment of damages, judges and juries who have difficulty
determining whether an auditor is negligent under the prevailing
standard will encounter even more confusion when trying to allo-
cate fault among co-defendants. 8
One specific solution proposed by the profession is expanding
the function of the AICPA quality control inquiry committee
("QCIC"), which currently is limited to determining whether alle-
gations in cases reported to the QCIC "suggest a flaw in the ac-
cused [accounting] firm's quality controls or compliance with them
or a fault in the profession's standards. 7 9 The proposed expansion
would allow a committee of experienced auditors to examine the
records of the accounting firm to determine if there had been a
faulty audit, if so, what caused it and what steps could be taken to
ensure that similar problems could be avoided in the future.80
However, instead of simply expanding the peer review and quality
control process, the accounting profession should establish a pro-
fessional committee to determine definitive standards of care and
lobby for legislative recognition of these standards as the basis for
determining the level of professional negligence which triggers lia-
bility. An issue left unresolved by the Bily court was whether an
auditor's compliance with GAAS and GAAP ensures freedom from
countants: A Statutory and Policy Analysis, 5 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 155 (1991).
76. Id.
77. Dahle, cited at note 75, at 155. Some jurisdictions follow National Surety Corp. v.
Lybrand, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939), which held that accountants can use the defense of contrib-
utory negligence only when the plaintiff's negligence interferes with the accountant's ability
to perform his duty. Dinallo, cited at note 75, at 346 (citing National Surety, 9 N.Y.S.2d at
563). Other courts follow Craig v. Anyon, 208 N.Y.S. 259 (1925), which permits accountants
to use the defense of contributory negligence without limitation. Dinallo, cited at note 75, at
345 (citing Craig, 208 N.Y.S. at 268-69).
Another potential problem with this solution occurs when the auditor is merely negligent
while management of the client company has engaged in intentionally fraudulent conduct.
Most jurisdictions hold that comparative negligence principles cannot be applied in these
situations, i.e., intentional conduct cannot be compared with a co-defendant's negligence to
determine proportional fault. Leibman, cited at note 74, at 396-97 (citations omitted).
78. Leibman, cited at note 74, at 385.
79. POB Annual Report Stresses Liability Crises, J. AccT., Feb. 1993, at 21.
80. Id.
1994
862 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 32:849
liability or if other factors can be considered.81 A case of this na-
ture against an accountant normally presents a complex factual sit-
uation that requires interpretation of technical accounting princi-
ples which the average jury member is unable to understand. 2 Fair
and consistent results can only be obtained with a standardized
evaluation system.
III. CONCLUSION
The dissenting opinion in Bily incorrectly states that "an ac-
countant performing an audit is subjected to negligence liability
only upon proof of a failure to perform a reasonably careful audit
according to generally accepted auditing standards."83 Currently,
accountants can be held liable even when they have fully complied
with recognized industry standards. Nationwide recognition of de-
finitive standards is essential to provide some measure of consis-
tency and certainty to accountants.
In view of the astounding potential liability that accountants are
subject to,"4 a limiting principle must be adopted to restrict the
81. The appellate court held that it was proper for the jury to consider the standards
in the auditor's own accounting manual even though these procedures were more rigorous
than those in GAAS. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 470, 476 (1990), rev'd on
other grounds, 834 P.2d 745 (1992).
82. One commentator has identified a problem in this area known as the "expectation
gap" which occurs because the public and accountants view the purposes of audits differ-
ently. Kean K. McDonald, Accountants' Liability to Third Parties: Unmanageable Risks
of Foreseeability, 57 DEF. COUNS. J. 194, 197 (1990). Generally, the public believes that the
auditor has a duty to detect fraud. Id. However, when a client perpetrates and actively hides
fraud, it can be difficult to detect as shown by the following example:
[A] company that wants to overstate its assets could either increase its accounts re-
ceivable by creating false sales documents or effectuate a double counting of the in-
ventory by transferring goods between locations during the observation phase of the
audit. In both cases, either by testing the accounts receivable or by varying the inven-
tory counting tests, an audit may uncover the fraud. On the other hand, as a result of
the combination of the auditors' professional judgment and the use of sampling tech-
niques, it is possible for a client's fraudulent misrepresentation to go undetected by
auditors despite following techniques that are accepted throughout the profession.
Id. at 198.
83. Bily, 834 P.2d at 779 (Kennard, J. dissenting).
84. For instance, in the recent Phar-Mor bankruptcy, in which the auditor is being
sued by the client, investors and creditors, Westinghouse Electric Corp., with an $84 million
investment in Phar-Mor, is taking a $155 million pretax charge against earnings that has
virtually wiped out third quarter per share earnings according to Westinghouse officials.
Westinghouse sold $61 million of Phar Mor stock to Massachusetts Financial Services Co., a
mutual fund, which subsequent to the bankruptcy filing, demanded a return of the $61 mil-
lion plus an additional $5 million for expenses and interest. Fallout From Phar-Mor Sends
Firms Reeling, PRIVATE PLACEMENT REP., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1.
The largest judgment against an accounting firm involved Coopers & Lybrand's allegedly
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scope of the accountant's duty of care. The Supreme Court has
previously demonstrated a willingness to limit auditors' liability to
third parties for negligent audits under the federal securities
laws. 5 A "federalization" of standards and redefinition of the
scope of liability as per the Bily decision is a solution which ade-
quately addresses the current problems. This can be achieved
through statutory preemption of the common law in this area or an
unequivocal ruling by the Supreme Court.
Anne T. Prillaman
faulty audits of Miniscribe, a defunct Colorado disk-drive maker. Although the case was
appealed and subsequently settled out of court, a jury originally ordered the firm to pay
damages of $200 million. Another example - Arthur Andersen paid $22 million for fraud
claims brought as a result of the Lincoln Savings & Loan scandal; Ernst & Young paid $63
million in settlements in the same action. A Flood of Litigation: Liability Suits Add Up on
Accountants, AUSTIN Bus. J., Sept. 28, 1992, at 9.
In a recent Arizona case, a purchaser of a bank who claimed to have relied on financial
statements negligently prepared by Price Waterhouse was awarded $338 million even
though the financial statements were not prepared for the sale. "The award was more than
the amount the buyer paid for the company, more than twice the out-of-pocket loss alleg-
edly suffered by the purchaser and more than 2,400 times the $140,000 annual fee Price
Waterhouse earned for each of the audit engagements. Edward Brodsky, Liabilities of Ac-
countants, N.Y. L. J., Dec. 9, 1992, at 3.
85. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976) (citations omitted).
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